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introduction
At 6:00 P.M. on December 23, 1913, President Woodrow Wilson entered his 
office. He was smiling as he looked around the circle of friends and associates 
who had assembled there. Spotting Carter Glass, the slightly built but exceed-
ingly influential congressman from Virginia, at the far end of the room, the 
President beckoned him to join Senator Robert Owen of Oklahoma at his 
side. After shaking Glass’s hand warmly, the President sat down at his desk and,   
using four gold pens, signed into law the Federal Reserve Act. As Arthur S. 
Link, Wilson’s principal biographer, has written, “Thus ended the long strug-
gle for the greatest single piece of constructive legislation of the Wilson era and 
one of the most important domestic Acts in the nation’s history.’’1
  With  this  law,  Congress  established  a  central  banking  system,  which 
would enable the world’s most powerful industrial nation to manage its money 
and credit far more effectively than ever before. As essential as our central 
banking system appears to be in today’s complex economy, the political and 
legislative struggle to create the Federal Reserve System was long and often 
extremely bitter, and the final product was the result of a carefully crafted yet 
somewhat tenuous political compromise.6
Indeed, until nearly the beginning of the 20th century the United States had 
been a nation dominated by its frontier and its enormous expanse of rich and 
fertile land. Born in the dawn of the modern age, the United States in its 
first decades was a land of small farms and nearby towns with few cities of 
any consequence, and the young nation seemed far more interested in becom-
ing a successful experiment in democracy rather than an economic power. As   
a result, the institutions necessary to a commercial society—large cities, a com-
mon medium of exchange, and a mechanism to regulate that medium—were 
greeted with indifference if not outright hostility.
  Yet, America’s very success as an experiment in democracy, and its tre-
mendous  agricultural  production,  provided  the  base  for  an  urban  and,   
ultimately, an industrial society. “The United States was born in the country 
and has moved to the city,” Professor Richard Hofstadter wrote.2 Yet, some of 
the young nation’s most eloquent leaders were strong champions of the agrar-
ian way of life who disdained urban life, and the continuing conflict between   
rural values and urban reality has been one of the most important themes of 
American history.
State Street in 19th century, Boston
Courtesy, Boston Public Library, Print Department7
chapter 1
Early Experiments in Central Banking
1791: THE FIRST ATTEMPT
The conflict between rural values and urban reality was sharply etched in the 
first major political controversy following the ratification of the Constitution 
in 1789, a controversy, in the first years of George Washington’s presidency, 
which dealt with the myriad of issues regarding the monetary and fiscal powers 
of the new federal government. Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton 
advocated the creation of a central bank, a Bank of the United States, to man-
age the government’s money and to regulate the nation’s credit. Secretary of 
State Thomas Jefferson strongly disagreed, arguing that since the Constitution 
N.C. Wyeth’s Alexander Hamilton Mural, painted  
for the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in 1922
Courtesy, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
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did not specifically empower the Congress to create a central bank Congress 
could not constitutionally do so. Hamilton responded that Congress could   
create just such a bank under the constitutional clause giving it all powers   
“necessary and proper” to the exercise of its specifically enumerated responsi-
bilities; since Congress had been given so many monetary and fiscal powers, 
Hamilton argued, it would be perfectly proper for it to create a central bank to 
carry them out. Hamilton won the argument, and the First Bank of the United 
States was created in 1791.
  The First Bank of the United States had a capital stock of $10 million, 
of which $2 million was subscribed by the federal government, while the re-
mainder was subscribed by private individuals. Five of the 25 directors were 
appointed by the United States government, while the other 20 were chosen 
by the private investors in the bank. It was not only easily the largest bank of 
its time, but it was also the largest corporation in the United States; it was a 
nationwide bank, headquartered in Philadelphia but with branches in other 
major cities, and it performed the basic banking functions of accepting de-
posits and issuing bank notes, of making loans and of purchasing securities. 
  Its power made it useful to American commerce and to the federal gov-
ernment but frightening to many of the American people. Its charter ran for 
20 years, and when it expired, in 1811, Jefferson’s Virginia colleague, James 
Madison, was President. An opponent of the initial bill in 1791, Madison, like 
many other Jeffersonian Republicans, had changed his mind, and now subor-
dinated his initial constitutional objections and favored the bank’s recharter 
on the grounds of economic expediency. The vote in Congress was extremely 
close, but the bill to recharter the bank failed in both houses by the margin of 
a single vote.
  Chaos quickly ensued, brought on by the disruptions of the War of 
1812 and by the lack of a central regulating mechanism over banking and 
credit. State-chartered private banks proliferated, and issued a bewildering   
variety  of  bank  notes  that  were  sometimes  of  little  value.  Moreover,  the   
federal government lacked a safe repository for its own funds, a reliable mecha-
nism to transfer them from place to place, and adequate means to market its   
own securities.
Alexander Hamilton      Thomas Jefferson      James Madison              Andrew Jackson
Courtesy, Library of Congress9
1816: THE CONTROVERSIAL SECOND BANK
By 1816, Madison’s final year as President, a bill to charter a Second Bank 
of the United States was introduced in Congress. Henry Clay, Speaker of the 
House, had opposed recharter of the first bank five years earlier on the grounds 
that  Congress  had  no  right  to  charter  such  an  institution.  “The  force  of   
circumstance and the lights of experience,” Clay now said, persuaded him that 
Congress did have this power. Enough other congressmen felt the same force 
and saw the same light so that the bill chartering the Second Bank of the Unit-
ed States narrowly passed both houses and received the President’s signature.
   Second Bank of the United States was very much like the first, except 
that it was much larger; its capital was not $10 million but $35 million. Like 
the first, one-fifth of the stock was owned by the federal government and one-
fifth of the directors were appointed by the President; also, like the first, the 
charter was to run for 20 years.
  So powerful was the Second Bank of the United States that many citizens, 
politicians, and businessmen came to view it as a threat to themselves and as 
a menace to American democracy. Andrew Jackson, who became President in 
1829 when the charter still had seven years to run, made clear his opposition to 
the bank and its recharter. Jackson has occasionally been labeled an economic 
illiterate, and it does appear that he neither understood nor sympathized with 
the functions of money and banking. Nevertheless, many diverse groups in 
the nation feared the bank’s power and supported Jackson’s opposition to it. 
“The Downfall of Mother Bank”
Courtesy, New York Historical Society, New York11
It was essentially the bank’s vast economic power which made it politically 
vulnerable. State-chartered banks, farmers, businessmen on the rise, and many 
politicians saw the bank as a giant monster standing in their way.
  Despite the deep opposition to the bank, Henry Clay, Jackson’s opponent 
in the 1832 presidential election, was able to push a bill through Congress to 
recharter the bank and intended to use Jackson’s veto of the bill as a campaign 
issue. Jackson’s powerful veto message denounced the bank as unconstitutional 
and described the dangers of “such a concentration of power in the hands of 
a few men irresponsible to the people.” Though the President was on shaky 
grounds in challenging the bank’s constitutionality (the Supreme Court in the 
famous 1819 case of McCulloch v. Maryland had specifically affirmed the con-
stitutionality of the bank), his attack on the bank’s power touched a popular 
nerve. Clay and his supporters widely circulated Jackson’s veto message, but 
they greatly misjudged the popular response to it, and the President’s impres-
sive victory in the election was the beginning of the end of the Second Bank 
of the United States. When its charter expired in 1836, it ceased its role as 
America’s central bank.
  For the next quarter century America’s banking was carried on by a myri-
ad of state-chartered banks with no federal regulation. Although in some areas 
of the country such as New York, New England and Louisiana, the area bank-
ing system functioned with restraint, in other areas of the country, banking was 
not so stable, and the difficulties in American finance hampered the stability of 
the American economy. Under this system of state-chartered banks exclusively, 
there were often violent fluctuations in the amount of bank notes issued by 
banks and the amount of demand deposits (that is, checking account depos-
its) held by banks. The bank notes, issued by the individual banks, varied in 
quality from the relatively good to the unrelievedly bad. Finally, this banking 
system was hampered by inadequate bank capital, risky loans, and insufficient 
reserves against the bank notes and demand deposits.
Bank Note from Hampden Bank, Westfield, Massachusetts
Courtesy, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
The Supreme Court in 
the famous 1819 case  
of McCulloch v. Mary-
land had specifically 
affirmed the constitu-
tionality of the bank.12
1863: THE NATIONAL BANKING ACT
During the Civil War Congress passed the National Banking Act of 1863, 
along with major amendments in 1864 and 1865, and this legislation brought 
a  much  greater  measure  of  clarity  and  security  to  American  banking  and   
finance.  Basically,  the  legislation  provided  for  the  creation  of  nationally- 
chartered banks (all such banks are recognized by the word “National” or the 
letters “N.A.”—which stand for “National Association”—in their title), and, 
by effectively taxing the state bank notes out of existence, the legislation in   
reality provided that only the national banks could issue bank notes. 
  The legislation also provided stringent capital requirements for the na-
tional banks, and mandated that the circulating bank notes be backed by 
holdings of United States government securities. Other provisions dealt with 
The Abraham Lincoln Mural, by N.C. Wyeth, was  
painted for the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in 1922 
Courtesy, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston13
lending limits, examinations by the newly-created office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency, and reserves against both notes and deposits. To the surprise 
of many who had supported the national banking legislation, state-chartered 
banks were able to survive even though they no longer had the incentive to 
issue bank notes mainly because the use of checks was increasing rapidly. As a 
result, demand deposits (checking accounts) and not bank note issues became 
the most important source of funds to the banks.
 
  Yet  the  national  banking  legislation  of  the  1860s  ultimately  proved 
inadequate. Though  it  provided  for  the  national  chartering  of  banks  and   
national  bank  notes,  it  still  did  not  provide  the  essentials  of  central   
banking.  Accordingly,  banking  remained  essentially  a  local  function  with-
out an effective mechanism which would regulate the flows of money and 
credit and which would assure the security 
of  the  nation’s  system  of  finance.  What   
institutional  arrangements  on  a  nation-
al level that were to develop in the next   
half-century  (correspondent  relationships 
and  check  clearing  operations,  for  ex-
ample) grew up in the vacuum of federal   
activity;  such  arrangements  were  private   
and quite beyond the control or regulation   
of national policy.
Check clearing in the 1860s: “The ten o’clock terrors who never made errors”
Courtesy, Boston Clearing House, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Archives
The first Wells Fargo office, San Francisco, California
Courtesy, Wells Fargo Bank, History Room, San Francisco14
BANKING PROBLEMS PERSIST
In the absence of a central banking structure, America’s financial picture was 
increasingly characterized by inelastic currency and immobile reserves. The   
national bank note currency, secured by government bonds, grew or contracted 
in response to the realities of the bond market rather than in response to the   
requirements of American business. The amount 
of currency in circulation, therefore, depended 
upon the value of bonds which the national banks 
held rather than upon the needs of the econo-
my. Such inelasticity in the currency tended to   
aggravate  matters  rather  than  alleviate  them, 
causing the economy to gyrate wildly and some-
what uncertainly between booms and busts. 
  Moreover,  under  the  national  banking 
system the bank reserves were spread around 
the  country,  but  they  tended  to  be  immo-
bile  where  they  sat.  There  were  three  types 
of  national  banks:  country  banks,  reserve 
city  banks,  and  central  reserve  city  banks. 
Country  banks  (all  national  banks  located 
in places other than the 50 cities which were   
reserve and central reserve cities) had to keep 
part of their reserves in the form of vault cash, and the rest in the form of a de-
posit with a national bank in a reserve or central reserve city. Reserve city banks 
(all national banks located in 47 specific and generally important cities) had to 
keep part of their reserves in the form of vault cash, and the rest in the form 
of a deposit with a national bank in a central reserve city bank. Central reserve 
city banks (all national banks within only three cities: New York, Chicago, and 
St. Louis) had to keep all of their reserves in the form of vault cash.
  This meant that 50 different cities in the nation served as reserve de-
positories. Even though the total of reserves in the national banking system 
was very large, the economic value of this reserve was largely mitigated be-
cause it was so spread out; it was as if the American army were scattered all 
over the country, with each soldier assigned to protect his own specific area of   
several square miles. Such an army would clearly be infinitely less powerful than 
one whose forces were all gathered in a few strategic locations. The reserves of 
money could not be shifted easily to areas of the country needing them.
  Also, the fact that reserve city banks held reserves for the country banks, and 
that their own reserves were held by central reserve cities, meant that the central 
reserve city banks, particularly those in New York, were unusually sensitive to the 
demands for currency from the country banks. When the country banks needed 
currency, particularly during the crop selling season, those banks would get their 
Courtesy, Philadelphia Record15
currency by drawing down their reserve ac-
counts with their reserve city banks. Those 
banks, now with less vault cash, were com-
pelled to draw down their own reserve ac-
counts with their central reserve city banks. 
It was much like a whip, where a little force 
at one end produced a tremendous force at 
the other; demands for currency from the 
country banks often put inordinate pres-
sure upon the central reserve city banks.
  As  America’s  industrial  economy  be-
came larger and more complex in the wan-
ing years of the 19th century and the early 
years of the 20th, these weaknesses in the national banking system—inelastic 
currency and immobile reserves—became increasingly more critical. It had be-
come clear that the national banking system did not provide the regulating 
mechanism for money and banking that the two Banks of the United States 
had provided early in the nation’s history. And as the American economy be-
came larger, more urban, and more complex, the inelastic currency and the im-
mobile reserves contributed to the cyclical pattern of booms and busts. These 
wide gyrations were becoming more and more intolerable. 
  Financial panics occurred with some frequency, and they often triggered 
an economic depression. In 1893 a massive depression rocked the American 
economy as it had never been rocked before. Even though prosperity returned 
before the end of the decade—and largely for reasons which this nation could 
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Wall Street’s curb market, 1902
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chapter 2 
Financial Reform in the 20th Century
In 1907 a severe financial panic jolted Wall Street and forced several banks
into failure. This panic, however, did not trigger a broader economic collapse. 
Yet, the simultaneous occurrence of general prosperity with a crisis in the   
nation’s financial centers did persuade many Americans that their banking 
structure was sadly out of date and in need of major reform.
1908: THE MONETARY COMMISSION
The initial response of Congress was feeble. In 1908 it passed the Aldrich-
Vreeland Act, which was designed to make the money supply somewhat more 
elastic during emergency currency shortages. This was not financial reform 
but a temporary palliative. Another provision of the law created the National   
Monetary Commission. This body, composed of nine senators and nine mem-
bers of the House of Representatives, had the responsibility of making a com-
prehensive study of the necessary and desirable changes in the money and 
banking system of the United States. 
Bank run in the early 1900s
Courtesy, Library of Congress
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  The chairman and dominant member of the commission was Senator   
Nelson W. Aldrich of Rhode Island, the single most powerful member of the 
United States Senate and a pillar of the eastern establishment. Aldrich’s promi-
nence and power sharply reflected the political controversies of the period. In the 
1890s the rural populists of the South and West had challenged the institutions 
and the power of finance and business, for they felt that the wealth and “special 
privileges” enjoyed by the few were resulting in the exploitation of the many. 
  In the first decade of the 20th century, the progressive movement—more 
broadly based than the populists, better educated, more urban, and more sophis-
ticated in understanding and in using political power—won control of many state 
governments and elected many senators and representatives. Though the pro-
gressive movement comprised a diversity of people and took a variety of forms, its   
major  purpose  was  to  limit  and  regu-
late  the  new  aggregations  of  economic   
and political power, which the growth of indus-
trial America had spawned.
        In the bitter controversies between the   
progressives, who generally represented the small   
business owners and the small town and farm-
ing  population,  and  the  conservatives,  who   
generally represented the most powerful business 
and banking groups of the large eastern cities, 
Aldrich was a central figure. The Rhode Island 
senator was one of the most prominent critics 
of the progressives, and the progressives, in turn, 
found Aldrich to be one of the most bitter and 
stalwart champions of American conservatism. 
(The  marriage  of  Aldrich’s  only  daughter  to 
John D. Rockefeller, Jr., further convinced many 
Americans that Aldrich was the champion of the 
rich and financially secure.)
     In short, the need for financial reform had become most evident just 
when the progressives were attempting to limit the power of the financial com-
munity. While most bankers were interested in reforming the financial structure 
of the nation to make it more efficient and centralized, the progressives were   
interested in reforming the financial structure by making the banking system 
less powerful. The National Monetary Commission, under Aldrich’s direction, 
was empowered to undertake a broad study of the nation’s financial needs; while 
the bankers generally applauded the Commission, the progressives viewed it 
with suspicion, believing that anything Aldrich and the banking community   
supported would serve their narrow interests rather than the interests of the 
American people.
“Some Horses Just Fear a Bridle,” by J. Darling
Courtesy, Des Moines Register18
BANKERS AND THE ALDRICH PLAN
Over  the  following  three  years  the  National  Monetary  Commission   
undertook a broad and exhaustive study of America’s financial needs and re-
sources, conducting investigations and hearings in many American cities and 
visiting many foreign banking institutions. In January, 1911, Senator Aldrich 
presented to a group of businessmen in Washington his plan for a reform of the 
nation’s banking and financial institutions. This plan, which was so clearly pre-
pared under the influence of large bankers, was strongly attacked by the progres-
sives and never appealed to the public. Moreover, the conservative Republican   
Aldrich presented his plan just after the election of 1910, in which the Demo-
crats captured Congress for the first time in nearly two 
decades  while  Republican  President  William  Howard 
Taft, supported by the party’s conservatives, was increas-
ingly besieged by the party’s progressive wing. In short, 
Aldrich presented his plan just after his party had suf-
fered a serious rebuff at the polls, and while a President 
sympathetic to his views was under growing attack within 
his own party.
  The Aldrich plan provided for one central institu-
tion, to be called the National Reserve Association, with 
branches all over the country and with the power to is-
sue currency, and to rediscount the commercial paper of 
member banks. Control of the institution would reside in 
a board of directors, the overwhelming majority of whom 
would be bankers.
  The  Aldrich  plan  received  scant  public  support  and  aroused  strong   
opposition.  Many  progressives  protested  that  the  Aldrich  plan  would  not   
provide for adequate public control of the banking system, that it would enhance 
the power of the larger banks and the influence of Wall Street, and that its cur-
rency reform provisions would be dangerously inflationary. “Big financiers are 
back of the Aldrich currency scheme,” William Jennings Bryan proclaimed. The   
Nebraska populist, a three-time Democratic presidential nominee who had 
based his campaign in 1896 on an attack on the bankers and the deflationary 
impact of the gold standard, asserted that, if the Aldrich plan were implement-
ed, the big bankers would, “then be in complete control of everything through 
the control of our national finances.”
  Bryan’s denunciation of the Aldrich plan was shared by many leaders of 
the progressive movement. Though this opposition signaled an early demise 
for the kind of currency and financial plan that the bankers wanted, two sig-
nificant events of 1912 helped to prepare the way for passage of a banking and 
currency reform program which the bankers in general feared, but which the 
progressives wanted—a reform designed to limit the power of the banking 
Senator Nelson Aldrich
Courtesy, Rhode Island Historical Society19
“It might help some if Wall Street gave trading stamps,” Puck Magazine
Courtesy, Boston Public Library
system  and  put  central  banking 
under public, rather than banker, 
control.
THE “MONEY TRUST”
The first significant event of 1912 
was the hearings before the House 
Banking  and  Currency  Commit-
tee,  the  so-called  Pujo  hearings, 
which examined the control of the 
banking and financial resources of 
the nation. These hearings, which 
continued  into  the  early  months 
of  1913,  apparently  persuaded 
most of the American people that 
the ultimate control over Ameri-
ca’s banking and financial system   
rested in the hands of a tiny group 
on  Wall  Street,  the  so-called 
“money  trust.”  In  its  report,  is-
sued in February, 1913, the com-
mittee said, “If by a ‘money trust’ 
is meant an established and well   
defined identity and community 
of interest between a few leaders 
of finance… which has resulted in 
a vast and growing concentration 
of  control  of  money  and  credit 
in  the  hands  of  a  comparatively 
few  men…  the  condition  thus 
described  exists  in  this  country   
today.”
  The  second  event  of  1912,   
crucial  to  financial  reform,  was 
the election of Democrat Woodrow Wilson to the Presidency. Elected on a 
progressive platform, and with a record as a reformist governor of New Jersey, 
Wilson pledged himself to financial reform without the creation of a central 
bank. The new President, however, knew very little about banking, and he had 
to rely upon others for advice on the shape of his reform proposal.
  One leading public figure Wilson could not ignore was William Jennings 
Bryan, and Bryan’s views were a strong force in shaping the financial reform 
program that ultimately became the Federal Reserve System. A three-time 
Pujo Committee in 1913 examined the control of the banking and financial  
resources of the nation     Courtesy, Library of Congress20
Democratic presidential nominee, 
Bryan had a very wide following 
in the rural states, and he was a 
strong and vocal leader of the an-
ti-Wall  Street  Democrats.  At  the 
1912  Democratic  convention  he 
dramatically threw his support to 
Wilson and received much of the 
credit for the latter’s ultimate nom-
ination. The new President named 
Bryan  his  Secretary  of  State.  For 
years Bryan had a reputation as one of the nation’s most outstanding and en-
thralling public speakers, but some people who knew him best believed that 
the power of his oratory concealed the paucity of his intellect.
  One of his cabinet colleagues later sneered: “I discovered that one could 
drive a prairie schooner through any part of his argument and never scrape 
against a fact or a sound statement.’’1 As we have already seen, Bryan had 
strongly opposed the Aldrich plan as just an attempt to give the big bankers 
even more power; to Bryan, currency reform and curbing the power of the 
leading financiers were the very same thing. “The currency can be given all the 
elasticity it needs without increasing the privileges of the banks or the influence 
of Wall Street,” he said at one point.
  Wilson had echoed Bryan’s feelings in the past. A year before his election 
Wilson asserted, “The greatest monopoly 
in this country is the money monopoly,” 
and a few months later he declared that the 
nation would not accept, “any plan which 
concentrates  control  in  the  hands  of  the 
banks.” It was probably a combination of 
political realities and his own lack of knowl-
edge about banking and finance that caused 
Wilson to reflect many of Bryan’s views, but 
after his election to the Presidency, Wilson 
relied on others for more expert advice on 
the currency question. Two of his most im-
portant advisers were Representative Carter 
Glass of Virginia, soon to become chair-
man of the House Committee on Banking 
and  Finance,  and  the  committee’s  expert   
adviser, H. Parker Willis (formerly profes-
sor of economics at Washington and Lee 
President Wilson and President Taft
Courtesy, Library of Congress
“He Loves Me, He Loves Me Not,“ Puck Magazine
Courtesy, Boston Public Library21
University, and in 1912, associate editor of the New York Journal of Commerce). 
Throughout most of 1912, Glass and Willis had conferred repeatedly on the 
currency problem, and Willis finally completed a tentative draft of a bill by the 
end of October—just a few days before Wilson’s victory.
BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD:  
THE GLASS-WILLIS PROPOSAL
On December 26, 1912, Glass and Willis traveled to Princeton, New Jersey to 
lay their plan before the President-elect. Wilson was suffering from a cold and 
he canceled all of his other appointments, but he insisted that Glass and Wil-
lis keep their interview as scheduled. With great enthusiasm the two visitors   
presented to Wilson their plan for reforming the financial structure (yet avoid-
ing the creation of a central bank under banker domination) and remedying 
the  classic  problems  of  immobile  reserves  and  inelastic  money  supply. The 
Glass-Willis proposal called for the creation of twenty or more privately con-
trolled regional reserve banks, which would hold a portion of member banks’   
reserves, perform other central banking functions, and issue currency against 
commercial assets and gold.
      Wilson liked much of the Glass-Willis proposal, but he 
wanted something else added—a central board to control and 
coordinate the work of the regional reserve banks, what he called 
the “capstone” to the entire structure. At first Carter Glass was 
appalled by Wilson’s proposal, fearing that it would result in 
the same centralization that he had so disliked in the Aldrich 
plan, but he kept his views fairly quiet and soon his fears faded. 
The “capstone” that Wilson wanted—a Federal Reserve Board 
—was to be a public agency unlike the banker-dominated cen-
tral bank of the Aldrich plan. The Glass-Willis proposal of De-
cember, 1912, with Wilson’s modifications, formed the basic   
elements of the Federal Reserve Act signed into law in Decem-
ber, 1913.
     Nevertheless, from December, 1912, when Wilson first 
talked  with  Glass  and  Willis  about  currency  reform,  until   
December, 1913, when the President signed the Federal Reserve 
Act into law, the Glass proposal was attacked from two sides: 
on one side, bankers (especially from the big city institutions) 
and conservatives thought that the bill intruded too much gov-
ernment into the financial structure, while on the other side the 
agrarians and radicals from the West and South thought that the 
bill gave the government too little authority over banking. Bryan   
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was the national spokesman for the latter group, and it was his views that Wilson 
had to face first.
  The first action of the new Wilson Administration upon taking office on 
March 4, 1913, was to work for a downward revision of the tariff. Currency 
reform would follow as a second item of business. The President recognized 
that it would be a difficult struggle to get both bills through the Congress, 
but the Democrats were somewhat more united on tariff reduction than they 
were on currency reform and so it made political sense to tackle the tariff issue 
first. Throughout April, May, and June this issue dominated Congress and the 
President, and through the rest of the summer high-tariff Republican senators 
(who generally favored the Aldrich plan) dragged out the debate on the tariff in 
an attempt to delay consideration of the banking bill. On October 3 the major 
tariff reduction bill was on Wilson’s desk, and he signed the new law much to 
the gratitude of the Democratic progressives.
BATTLE LINES DRAWN
Although placated by Wilson’s leadership in the tariff struggle, the Democratic 
progressives nevertheless were far more concerned about the banking bill that   
the President was preparing. By the late spring of 1913, Bryan (who was sup-
porting Wilson on tariff reduction) had made clear his opposition to the Glass 
bill and his determination to give government a larger role over banking and 
currency than Glass contemplated. Specifically, Bryan thought that the bill gave 
bankers too much control over the proposed Federal Reserve System, hence fail-
ing to weaken Wall Street’s credit mo-
nopoly, and he believed that the curren-
cy should be issued by the government 
rather than by the reserve banks, as the 
Glass bill proposed.
  Buffeted by this conflict within 
his Administration, President Wilson 
sought a compromise that could please 
both Glass and Bryan and then win 
the support of Congress, yet a com-
promise that would genuinely resolve 
the  banking  and  currency  problem. 
To sharpen his own thinking, Wilson 
sought the advice of the man whose 
opinions on economic matters he re-
spected above all others, the prominent 
attorney Louis D. Brandeis. Brandeis, 
a man of undeniable brilliance, sided  “Bryan versus Wilson,” Puck Magazine
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with Bryan on two key points: first, he believed that bankers must be excluded 
from control of the new system; and second, he believed that the Federal Re-
serve currency must be made an obligation of the United States government. 
“The conflict between the policies of the Administration and the desires of the 
financiers and of big business, is an irreconcilable one,” Brandeis told Wilson. 
“Concessions to the big business interests must in the end prove futile.’’2
  After several conferences, Wilson met on June 17 with Glass, Secretary 
of the Treasury William G. McAdoo, and Senator Robert Owen of Oklahoma 
(chairman of the newly created Senate Banking and Currency Committee and 
a supporter of Bryan’s views), and he told them that he would insist upon 
exclusive government control of the Federal Reserve Board and would insist 
upon making Federal Reserve notes the obligation of the United States. The 
former was clearly a victory of substance for the Bryan group, while the latter 
point was merely a victory of form.
  What  Bryan  and  his  followers  really  wanted  was  the  retirement  of   
national bank notes and their replacement by a supply of paper money issued 
on the initiative of public officials and backed up only by the government’s 
promise to pay. What Bryan really got, however, was just the addition of rela-
tively meaningless language to the basic provisions of the Glass bill. The Glass 
bill provided that Federal Reserve notes would be issued by the regional reserve 
banks against their own commercial assets and a 331/3 percent gold reserve, 
and the change which placated Bryan and other progressives was the mere 24
declaration that these notes were obligations of the federal government. This 
additional language did not change the essential character of Federal Reserve 
notes as asset currency. Glass had been initially disappointed with Wilson’s 
request for a public board to control the new system, but seeing that this was 
the absolute minimum that Bryan demanded, Glass had no real alternative but 
to accept it.
  On June 23, 1913, President Wilson appeared before a joint session of 
Congress and presented his program for currency reform. With a united Ad-
ministration now behind him, the President pleaded for a banking system that 
would provide for an elastic currency and that would vest control in the gov-
ernment, “so that the banks may be the instruments, not the masters, of busi-
ness and of individual enterprise and initiative.”
  Most bankers did not like what they heard. Particularly vigorous—and   
often very bitter—in their opposition were the big-city bankers, especially from 
New York. Conservatives also lambasted the bill as a radical break in the nation’s 
laissez-faire economic policy. The bankers speaking out in opposition, having 
favored the Aldrich plan of a central bank under banker control, disliked the 
framework of government regulation, dominated by political appointees. Bank-
ers in the central reserve cities of New York, Chicago, and St. Louis, as well 
as many bankers in the 47 reserve cities, disliked the fact that the new Fed-
eral Reserve banks would be the sole holders of reserves for the national banks.   
(It will be recalled that under the national banking system, national banks in 
central reserve cities and reserve cities were reserve depositories for other banks.)
  Many  bankers  with  nationally  chartered  banks  disliked  compul- 
sory membership in the Federal Reserve System for national banks, and they 
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criticized the bill’s assault on “private rights.” Finally, many conservatives and 
bankers were strong Republicans, and they termed the bill a Democratic party 
measure for the altogether logical reason that it was written and sponsored 
by a Democratic Administration, a Democratic Administration apparently 
dominated by its southern, western, and “anti-business” elements. The New 
York Times referred derisively to the, “Oklahoma idea, the Nebraska idea,” 
clearly pointing to Senator Owen and Secretary of State Bryan who, as we 
have seen, played a major role in writing the bill and adding the government 
control, through the Federal Reserve Board, which bankers appeared to find 
most obnoxious.
  Continuing its harsh criticism, the Times said: “It reflects the rooted dis-
like and distrust of banks and bankers that has been for many years a great 
moving force in the Democratic party, notably in the Western and Far West-
ern States. The measure goes to the very extreme in establishing absolute   
political control over the business of banking.” The New York Sun, considered 
by many to be the spokesman for Wall Street at that time, called the bill, “this 
preposterous offspring of ignorance and unreason...covered all over with the 
slime of Bryanism.”
POLITICAL COMPROMISES
Just as earlier in the year Wilson had moved to still the opposition of Bryan 
and many progressives, now the President acted to attempt to reconcile the 
banking community to his currency bill. Accordingly, on June 25—just two 
days after the President had presented his bill to Congress—Wilson, along 
with Glass, Owen, and McAdoo, met with four leading bankers, who rep-
resented the currency commission of the American Banking Association. As 
a result of this conference some important modifications were made in the 
bill. One provided that national bank notes would be retired gradually, hence 
protecting the banks’ large investments in the bonds that backed this currency;   
another weakened the Federal Reserve Board’s authority over the rediscount rate,   
giving more responsibility in this matter to the regional reserve banks; final-
ly, the President agreed to accept a Federal Advisory Council, consisting of   
representatives of the banking community, to serve as a liaison between the   
reserve banks and the Federal Reserve Board. Despite Wilson’s efforts, the 
bankers at the conference were not satisfied, for they did not get what they 
wanted—a centralized structure under banker control—and the heart of the 
bill retained what they did not want—a decentralized structure under public 
(or, as the bankers put it, “political,” meaning Democratic) control.
  The next day Glass and Owen introduced the revised Federal Reserve bill in 
the House and Senate. Despite the continuing banker and conservative opposi-
tion, the Wilson Administration was in a strong position to get its currency bill 
passed through Congress. The Administration was unified in support of the bill, 26
progressive opinion in the country seemed to favor the currency program, and 
the President’s success in the tariff issue demonstrated his strong control over the 
Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress. For the Democrats, Wilson 
was their party’s first president in 16 years, and they were reluctant to embarrass 
him and themselves by resisting a major component of his program.
  In  fact,  however,  the  following  months  would  demonstrate  how   
difficult it was for Wilson to unify his party in Congress behind his program. 
Shortly after Glass and Owen introduced the bill, a rebellion broke out among 
some Democratic congressmen from rural areas in the South and West. Led by 
Representative Robert L. Henry of Texas (he was, Carter Glass later recalled, 
“an exceedingly likable fellow; but he knew as much about banking as a child 
about  astronomy”),3  this  group  demanded  that  the Wilson  Administration 
destroy the “Money Trust” before setting out to reform banking and currency. 
Moreover, these Democratic agrarians disliked the Federal Reserve bill’s provi-
sion for private control of the regional reserve banks, believing that this would 
be a private financial trust operating un-
der government protection.
  Most  important,  however,  the 
dissidents  protested  that  the  Federal 
Reserve bill made no provision for agri-
cultural credit, giving the farmers little 
hope of eliminating the state of debt 
that had ensnared them since the after-
math of the Civil War. “The bill as now 
written,” Representative Henry said in 
July, “is wholly in the interest of the 
creditor classes, the banking fraternity, 
and  the  commercial  world,  without 
proper provision for the debtor classes and those who toil, produce, and sustain 
the country.”4 To sustain his objections, Henry introduced a series of amend-
ments that would prohibit interlocking directorates among the member banks, 
weaken the structure of the Federal Reserve Board, and alter the currency issues 
in such a way as to enable farmers to obtain money on far more liberal terms.
  For  a  while  it  appeared  that  the  agrarian  bloc  might  be  able  to  kill 
the  Federal  Reserve  bill.  In  July  they  were  able  to  take  control  of  the 
House  Banking  and  Currency  Committee,  much  to  Chairman  Glass’s   
despair.  Yet  the  Henry  proposals  were  no  more  popular  with  the  general   
public than the Aldrich Plan had been, and many people regarded them as the 
wildest form of Populism.
  Again, President Wilson moved quickly to meet the opposition to the 
bill. He invited the agrarian leaders to the White House and mollified them, 
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Courtesy, New York Tribune27
in part at least, by agreeing to work for the pro-
hibition of interlocking directorates among the 
banks in his forthcoming antitrust bill. With 
a combination of pleas, promises, and perhaps 
even threats Wilson was able to beat back much 
of the opposition from the agrarian bloc, and in 
early August the House Banking and Currency 
Committee reversed the direction it had taken a 
few weeks earlier and overwhelmingly approved 
the Federal Reserve bill.
         Though beaten in the committee, Represen-
tative Henry did not yet give up; he now worked 
to get the House Democratic caucus to kill or   
severely modify the Federal Reserve bill. With 
the  agrarian  opposition  still  a  threat  to  the   
passage of the bill, the most prominent agrarian 
radical in the country—Secretary of State Wil-
liam Jennings Bryan—moved dramatically to save it. Promising that the Ad-
ministration would work to deal with the problem of interlocking directorates 
in the antitrust bill, Bryan asked his friends to stand by the President and sup-
port his banking program. Bryan’s prestige was so great in the rural areas that 
his forceful advocacy shattered the radical opposition within the House, and the 
House Democratic caucus overwhelmingly approved the measure by the end of 
August. This approval meant that the Federal Reserve bill was a party measure, 
binding on all House Democrats.
  Formal approval by the House Democratic caucus greatly weakened radi-
cal agrarian opposition, and was but one of many indications that the Federal 
Reserve bill was coming to enjoy broader public support. Progressive opin-
ion, in favor of banking and currency reform for several years, endorsed the 
changes recently made in the bill. Additionally there were strong indications 
of growing support for the bill among the nation’s business community, with 
the small business owners especially enthusiastic about it. Finally, and perhaps 
most important, a few fissures had begun to appear in the wall of opposition 
put up by the nation’s bankers. As early as June several leading Chicago bank-
ers had enthusiastically endorsed the measure, and a significant number of the 
small, country bankers in the South and Middle West were giving the bill their 
support. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the nation’s bankers—country and 
city—still strongly opposed the bill, often with the bitterest hostility; a San 
Antonio banker, for example, called the bill a “communistic idea.”
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OPPOSITION FROM BANKERS
In fact, the strong banker opposition came sharply into view at just about the 
time the House Democratic caucus was approving the bill. Meeting in Chicago 
in late August with a commission of the American Bankers Association, the 
presidents of 47 state banking associations and 191 clearinghouse associations 
raised many objections to the Administration’s banking reform. They made 
it clear that they wanted the Aldrich plan, with one central bank generally   
controlled by bankers and generally independent of government regulation.
  According to Wilson’s major biographer, Professor Arthur S. Link, the 
Chicago conference decisively altered the controversy 
over the banking issue, making the Administration more 
hostile to the bankers publicly opposing the Federal Re-
serve bill. Until this time Wilson and his major advis-
ers had believed that the bankers, despite their rhetoric, 
would in the final analysis work responsibly for the Ad-
ministration plan. The Chicago manifesto appeared to 
kill that hope and sharply etched the broad differences 
between the majority of the banking community and 
the Wilson Administration. From then until final pas-
sage of the Federal Reserve bill in December, the Wilson 
Administration tended to regard banker opposition as 
essentially irreversible.
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PASSAGE BY CONGRESS
With the hope that strong public support for the measure would neutralize 
banker opposition, Carter Glass began to push the bill through the House in 
early September, and on September 18 the House overwhelmingly approved it 
by a vote of 287 to 85. Though this vote was a clear victory for Wilson, signifi-
cant partisan division was also manifest; all but three Democrats supported the 
bill, while seven out of every 10 Republicans opposed it. (It should be noted 
that most far-reaching bills pass Congress with some partisan division, but if 
the law proves to be successful it ultimately comes to command broad, biparti-
san support; the Federal Reserve is certainly no exception to this.)
   Passage by the House was only half the battle, and apparently the easier 
half; indeed, the Senate scene was so confused that it was impossible to predict 
the outcome. Senator Owen, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, was 
an uncertain reed of support for the Glass bill. Originally he had surrendered 
his own bill to co-sponsor the Federal Reserve bill with Glass, yet at the time 
of the House caucus in August he publicly 
assailed the bill’s regional basis and its provi-
sion for mandatory membership for national 
banks.  Summoned  to  the  White  House  by 
Wilson, Owen publicly recanted his criticism 
of the bill, but his erratic behavior gave the 
measure’s supporters many uneasy moments.
  In addition to uncertainty about Owen’s 
support  and  doubts  about  his  effectiveness, 
the  Administration  was  further  weakened  in   
the Senate because its tactics backfired badly. 
Earlier in the session the Administration had got-
ten the tariff bill through both House and Senate 
without any committee hearings, on the grounds 
that  previous  lengthy  consideration  of  tariff   
reduction made more hearings unnecessary. The 
Administration used the same argument on the 
Glass bill, and it had worked in the House where 
no hearings were held. The Senate, however,   
rejected  the  Administration  position  and 
voted to hold full-scale hearings on the banking measure. Not only would   
extended hearings delay—and perhaps endanger—ultimate passage of the bill, 
they would also be conducted by the Senate Banking Committee, where Presi-
dent Wilson had less support among Democrats than he had in the Senate as 
a whole.
  Indeed, three of the seven Democrats on the Senate Banking Committee 
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—Gilbert Hitchcock of Nebraska, James O’ Gorman of New York, and James 
Reed of Missouri—appeared ready to combine with the Republican minority 
in an effort to drag out the hearings and perhaps ultimately kill the bill by slow 
strangulation. As a result the hearings, begun in September, wore on into Oc-
tober, and they became a forum for the bill’s opponents of both the right and 
the left. Banker opposition was especially vocal and vigorous. In early October, 
a few weeks after the House had overwhelmingly approved the bill and while 
the Senate hearings were continuing, the American Bankers Association held 
its annual convention in Boston and passed a series of resolutions denouncing 
the Federal Reserve bill as socialistic, confiscatory, unjust, un-American, and 
generally wretched.
  Wilson’s perception of these events was that 
the three Democratic senators, the Republican mi-
nority, and the largest bankers had joined in a con-
spiracy to kill his banking reform plan. Despite 
his intense irritation at the obstructionist tactics 
of the three Democratic senators, the President ul-
timately came to use the same tactics on them that 
he had used with such effectiveness on the House 
rebels; he called them into personal consultation 
at the White House and used a combination of 
pleas and promises to try to win their support, or 
at least their neutrality. Wilson agreed with them 
that the bill might have to be amended further, 
and this helped mollify the dissident senators.
  In late October, and with dramatic sudden-
ness, Wilson’s hopes for an accommodation were 
almost killed. Frank A. Vanderlip, president of the 
National City Bank of New York, appeared before 
the Senate Banking Committee and proposed an en-
tirely new banking and currency plan, which he had prepared at the request of 
Senators Hitchcock, Reed, and O’Gorman, the committee’s three Democrats. 
The Vanderlip plan called for the establishment of one Federal Reserve Bank 
with the capital to be subscribed by the public, the government, and the na-
tional banks. The central Federal Reserve Bank would have twelve branches 
around the country. Control of the bank would rest entirely in the hands of the 
federal government, and the bank could issue currency against its commercial 
assets and a 50 percent gold reserve.
  This bill managed to have an appeal both to the agrarian radical oppo-
nents on the left and the banker opponents on the right. Many progressives 
and agrarian radicals liked the thoroughgoing governmental control in the 
Vanderlip plan, while many conservatives liked it because it provided for just 
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one central bank. Some supported the Vanderlip plan because 
it appeared to restrict the power of private bankers and Wall 
Street, while others supported it because it appeared to put the 
control of banking into the hands of bankers. Finally, the fact 
that the public could buy stock in this bank (in contrast with 
the  Federal  Reserve  bill,  which  provided  that  only  member 
banks could buy capital stock in the regional banks) gave the 
bill added public appeal. Within a few hours of its introduction 
eight of the 12 members of the Senate Committee supported 
the Vanderlip plan.
         Wilson  voiced  immediately  his  strong  and  uncompro-
mising opposition to the Vanderlip plan, and, with his great 
popularity, this played a major role in weakening its public   
appeal. Under strong and continuing Administration pressure, 
O’Gorman and Reed were gradually moderating their opposition to the Fed-
eral Reserve bill, and by early November they finally came to publicly support 
its main features. Ultimately, in late November, the Senate committee reported 
two different bills to the full Senate—a slightly amended Federal Reserve bill, 
and the Vanderlip plan. The result of this maneuver was to break the hold that 
the Senate committee had exercised over the Federal Reserve bill. 
  Continuing  public  support  for  the  Federal  Reserve  bill  hastened   
final Senate action in December. Respected conservatives continued to speak in   
opposition—Republican  Senator  Elihu  Root  of  New  York  called  the  bill   
“financial heresy”—but they were overshadowed by the steady support from   
Progressive  leaders,  and  the  growing  support  for  the  bill  among  orga-
nized  business  opinion  and  a  growing  minority  of  bankers.  On  De-
cember  19  the  critical  vote  was  taken  in  the  Senate,  and  the  Federal   
Reserve  bill  was  narrowly 
preferred  over  the  modified 
Vanderlip plan by a margin of 
only three votes, 44 to 41. A few 
hours later the Senate passed the 
Federal Reserve bill itself, 54 to 
34. As in the final House vote 
partisan  division  was  evident, 
but it was even sharper in the 
Senate; all Democrats supported 
the measure while all but six Re-
publicans opposed it.
       
The  House  and  Senate  ver-
sions of the Federal Reserve bill 
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varied slightly, so the two bills went to a conference committee, composed 
of  members from both houses, to resolve the differences. For example, the 
House bill had provided that at least 12 regional reserve banks be created, but 
the Senate bill provided that the number of reserve banks be no fewer than 
eight but no more than 12; the conference committee accepted the Senate ver-
sion on this matter, yet the House conferees prevailed on some other points. In 
contrast with the months of congressional wrangling before the two bills were 
passed, the conference committee resolved the minor differences between the 
two measures in only two days, and 
both  the  House  and  Senate  quickly   
approved the compromise measure.
  On  December  23,  just  a  few 
hours after the Senate had completed 
action, President Wilson, surrounded 
by members of his family, his cabinet 
officers, and the Democratic leaders of 
Congress, signed the Federal Reserve 
Act.  “I  cannot  say  with  what  deep   
emotions  of  gratitude...  I  feel,”  the 
President said, “that I have had a part in 
completing a work which I think will   
be of lasting benefit to the business of 
the country.”
  The Federal Reserve Act was now 
law, and of all the men who deserve 
credit for this major reform of Amer-
ica’s banking and currency system—
Nelson Aldrich, Carter Glass, Robert 
Owen, William McAdoo, H. Parker 
Willis,  and  even  William  Jennings 
Bryan—none  deserves  more  credit 
than President Wilson himself. With-
standing the contrary demands of the 
private bankers on the one hand and the agrarian radicals on the other, the 
President had supervised the development of a bill and had skillfully com-
manded Democratic support for it and led it through the congressional thick-
et. The passage of the Federal Reserve Act stands as almost a textbook case of 
wise and skillful presidential leadership over Congress.
President Wilson signs the Federal Reserve Act
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Chapter 3     
Making the System Work
  The passage of the bill, however, was only the first step in the process of cre-
ating the Federal Reserve System. Now that Congress had acted, the Wilson Ad-
ministration had to take the bare bones of the new law and put the substance of a 
functioning institution upon them. The number of regional reserve banks need-
ed to be determined; their location needed to be established; lines of the various   
Federal Reserve districts needed to be drawn; the banks thus created needed to   
be staffed and opened for business; and finally, a Federal Reserve Board needed 
to be appointed. In appointing the Federal Reserve Board, President Wilson 
was to have the primary responsibility, but in establishing the regional reserve 
banks, others in the Administration were to have the central role.
  The  Federal  Reserve  Act  designated  three  federal  officials—the   
Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Comptroller of 
the Currency—to serve as the Reserve Bank Organization Committee. Their 
task was to designate not less than eight but not more than 12 cities to be the 
Federal Reserve cities, and to divide the nation into districts, each district to 
Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo and Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston 
Courtesy, Library of Congress
3334
contain only one Federal Reserve City. The only criteria given the committee 
by the law declared that the districts should be drawn, “with due regard to 
the convenience and customary course of business and shall not necessarily be   
coterminous with any State or States.”
  Wilson’s nominee for Comptroller of the Currency—John Skelton Wil-
liams—would not be confirmed by the Senate for several weeks, so the main 
burden of the committee’s work was carried on by the other two men. The Sec-
retary of the Treasury, William G. McAdoo, had already played a major role in 
drafting the bill and securing its passage through Congress. McAdoo had been 
raised in Georgia but had become prominent as a very successful New York at-
torney. A widower in his late 40s, McAdoo married President Wilson’s younger 
daughter in the spring of 1914. Hard-working and extremely able, McAdoo’s 
mind was unencumbered by rigid theories, and he was probably the domi-
nant member of the Wilson cabinet. He was also extremely ambitious, but 
his strong desire to be President (many thought McAdoo was obsessed by this 
objective) was never fulfilled, though he was to be a strong contender for the 
Democratic nomination in 1924. Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston, 
a brilliant classical economist, had been president of Washington University in 
St. Louis when Wilson named him to the Cabinet in 1913. Together, McAdoo 
and Houston made the key decisions in choosing the Federal Reserve cities and 
drawing the district lines, with Williams joining in toward the end of the final 
deliberations.
DISTRICT LINE DILEMMAS
In deciding on the number of Federal Reserve banks and their locations, the   
Reserve Bank Organization Committee faced, in miniature, the same controver-
sies that had deeply divided Congress on banking reform for several years. “On 
no point,” Parker Willis has written, “had there been sharper controversy than 
as to the issue whether banks should be four, eight, 12, or some other number.”1
  The law provided that there would be at least eight regional banks, but 
those who had favored the Aldrich plan with one central bank believed that eight 
regional banks was far too many. Since the law was now on the statute books, 
they insisted that the eight should be the maximum number of regional reserve 
banks, and they tried to get around the spirit of the law by insisting that the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York should be such a large institution as to dwarf the 
other seven regional reserve banks. In this way, the bank in New York would be 
a central bank in substance if not in form.
  According to this scheme, the New York district would cover the entire 
Northeast, with the major financial centers of Philadelphia and Boston serving 
as branches. Smaller reserve banks would be established in Chicago and San 
Francisco, with even smaller banks to be located in five other cities, but these 
seven would largely serve as satellites of the giant institution in New York. By 35
this approach those who had opposed – and still opposed – the regionalism 
of the Federal Reserve Act felt that they could get much of the form of a true   
central bank with a giant reserve bank in New York, while giving the advocates 
of a decentralized system the appearance of regionalism.
  On the other hand, the rural and small town spokesmen, who had worked 
so hard to guarantee public control over the system, wanted to establish the 
maximum number of 12 regional reserve banks. Even 12, some of them be-
lieved, might not be enough. In any case, they also wanted all 12 of the re-
gional reserve banks to be approximately the same size, with no one of them 
dominating the rest.
  So, the controversies evident in the writing of the Federal Reserve Act were 
carried over into the selection of the Federal Reserve cities. Accordingly, McAdoo 
and Houston decided to focus initially on the determination of how many Fed-
eral Reserve banks there would be and where those banks would be located, and 
only after they had reached those decisions would they draw the district lines.
  New York, then, became the early focal point in the controversy, for the 
size of the Federal Reserve bank to be established there (no one ever doubt-
ed that New York would receive a reserve bank) was a critical factor to both 
“New York and all the other Feds”
by Adam Redjinski36
sides  in  the  dispute.  In  the  first  week  of  January, 
1914, Secretaries McAdoo and Houston spent four 
days  in  New  York,  hearing  the  arguments  of  the 
city’s  financial  leaders  for  a  truly  gigantic  Federal   
Reserve  bank  there  that  would  completely  dwarf   
everything else in the system. J. P. Morgan, perhaps 
New  York’s  best  known  financier,  argued  that  the   
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  should  be  of 
commanding  importance  so  that  it  would  receive 
due recognition from the central banks of Europe, 
a view echoed by The New York Times. Most of the 
New York spokesmen wanted their bank’s territory to   
include New England and the states just to the south 
of New York, while some wanted the territory to ex-
tend as far as Ohio to the west and Washington, D.C. 
to the south. If the New York bank were to be as large 
as the city’s financial leaders desired, it would have   
approximately half of the total capitalization of the entire system.
  From the outset it was clear that McAdoo and Houston were not per-
suaded by the strong views of the New York bankers. “The present disposition 
of the organizers is to hobble New York,” The New York Times lamented. The 
two Secretaries took the position that their purpose was not to hobble anyone 
but to construct a coordinated system, and that the central banks of Europe 
would deal with the system as a whole rather than with just one of its parts.
OPINION IN BOSTON
McAdoo and Houston then went to Boston for two days and heard a some-
what different tune. Many of the leading Boston bankers had championed the 
Aldrich plan with its single central bank, so ideologically they had strong rea-
sons for favoring a large New York bank of which Boston would be a branch. 
Yet a combination of local pride and a belief that their own financial prob-
lems should be handled locally gave them strong reason for favoring a regional 
reserve bank for Boston. A director of one of Boston’s major banks put the 
dilemma well in a private letter to Secretary Houston: “If Boston were in the 
New York District, we should have a larger and better bank to rely on in time 
of stress. On the other hand, a local bank, even if not so strong, would perhaps 
be better acquainted with local matters and local credits, and would be more 
interested in helping out the local difficulties, and so might be just as useful as a 
stronger bank not so intimately connected with Boston.” He went on to point 
out that many Boston bankers were perplexed by this dilemma, with local 
pride and regional concerns mixed with their perception of broader national 
issues. “I don’t think that any of us are quite sure,” he confessed.2
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  These doubts, however, were generally expressed in private rather than 
in public, and in two days of open hearings in Boston, McAdoo and Hous-
ton heard many business and community leaders urge the establishment of a   
reserve bank in Boston. It was the business, political, and academic leadership 
rather than the Boston bankers who spoke out the most forcibly on behalf of 
Boston’s claims; J. Randolph Coolidge, Jr., president of the Boston Chamber 
of Commerce, and Professor O. M. W. Sprague of Harvard were among the 
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most persuasive witnesses to testify before McAdoo and Houston. William A. 
Gaston, president of the National Shawmut Bank, also strongly championed 
the Boston position in public testimony.
  Connecticut banks and business groups, on the other hand, made clear 
their desire to be associated with a New York bank rather than with a bank in 
Boston. The Hartford Clearing House Association, for example, declined the 
invitation of the Boston Chamber of Commerce to visit Boston and testify in 
favor of the city’s claims before the Reserve Bank Organization Committee.
  McAdoo  and  Houston  then  returned  to  Washington  and  heard   
testimony from community and business leaders representing other major 
East Coast cities. The argument for a large New York bank usually included   
Philadelphia as a branch, but a delegation from the latter city traveled to   
Washington to press their own claims for a regional reserve bank.
CANVASSING THE NATION
On January 18, McAdoo and Houston left on a long cross-country trip that 
ultimately covered 10,000 miles. They visited and held public hearings in   
Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, Lincoln, Denver, Seattle, Portland, San Fran-
cisco, Los Angeles, El Paso, Austin, New Orleans, Atlanta, Cincinnati, and 
Cleveland. At each stop they invited local business and community leaders 
to testify, and they also invited spokesmen from nearby cities that they would 
not visit. This well-publicized trip fueled the already intense speculation in 
the press and among America’s bankers as to what cities ultimately would be   
chosen.  It  was  very  clear  that  far  more  cities  wanted  the  honor  of   
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receiving  a  reserve  bank  than  the  law  would 
allow,  and  the  Reserve  Bank  Organiza-
tion  Committee  had  to  face  the  fact  that  no   
matter what it ultimately decided, many commu-
nities would be disappointed by their exclusion.
  As the two men traveled across the country 
they heard the local, and often parochial, pleas 
of  more  than  40  cities,  each  claiming  that  it 
should be the home of a Federal Reserve bank. 
“Reserve  Cities  are  springing  up  all  over  the   
United States,” Houston lamented to President 
Wilson  even  before  the  committee  formally   
began its work. “I think the Census experts are 
mistaken as to the number of cities in America. 
Certainly  nobody  could  have  imagined  that  so                     
many had strategic locations.”3
  For most of the cities making claims, the key 
question was probably not national economic considerations but local pride. 
As The New York Times said editorially, “The hearings of the reserve bank or-
ganizers, generally speaking, have been more remarkable for the local jealousies 
they have disclosed than for the perception that there was anything of national 
significance in the new departure.” One exception, however, appeared to be the 
West Coast, where Los Angeles, Seattle, and Portland deferred to San Francisco 
as the logical site for a Pacific Coast bank. McAdoo made several public state-
ments suggesting that the selection of the Federal Reserve bank cities was not 
nearly so important to the particular cities named, or to their future economic 
development, as most people appeared to assume.
  During  their  trav-
els  McAdoo  and  Houston 
learned  that  many  bank-
ers  outside  of  New  York 
were  not  very  enthusiastic 
about a gigantic New York   
Federal Reserve bank. Many 
of these bankers had favored 
the Aldrich plan proposing 
one  central  bank,  but  the 
Federal Reserve Act’s provi-
sion of at least eight reserve 
banks caused them to consider the factors of local pride and regional advantage.
  Not  surprisingly,  bankers  in  Chicago  and  St.  Louis  were  especial-
ly outspoken on this point. In 1914 there were three central reserve cities:   
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New York, Chicago, and St. Louis. Generally speaking, the bankers in the lat-
ter two cities opposed the idea of making the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York such a truly gargantuan institution that it would dwarf all other reserve 
banks. Perhaps most bankers in Chicago and St. Louis believed that their sta-
tus as a central reserve city entitled them to a Federal Reserve bank, and they 
wanted the bank located in their city to be somewhat comparable in size to 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, but considerably larger than the other   
Federal Reserve banks. Generally, the bankers in Chicago and St. Louis wanted 
only eight Federal Reserve banks. 
  Perhaps a majority of the bankers in other cities, as well as country bankers 
(especially those far removed from the New York area), and those members of 
Congress who had been the most ardent champions of the regional approach of 
the Federal Reserve Act favored the creation of twelve banks. They also wanted 
the New York bank to be one of twelve rather than the clearly dominant member. 
Some went so far as to suggest that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York should 
cover only the lower part of Manhattan Island, with the rest of New York City 
belonging to other districts.
  While the Reserve Bank Organization Committee was in the process of 
selecting reserve bank cities, it was very much concerned with the question 
of membership in the Federal Reserve System among the nation’s commercial 
banks. The Federal Reserve Act required all 
national banks to join the system (or forfeit 
their national charter), and it allowed state 
banks to join the system if they wished and if 
they met certain requirements of liquidity and 
soundness. Yet fresh in the memory of McA-
doo,  Houston,  and  John  Skelton  Williams 
was the fact that a majority of the nation’s 
bankers had opposed the Federal Reserve Act, 
many of them specifically opposing mandato-
ry membership for the national banks. They 
had reason to fear that many of the national 
banks would surrender their charters rather 
than join the system.
  Accordingly,  the  Reserve  Bank   
Organization  Committee  was  extremely 
solicitous  of  the  opinion  of  the  national 
banks. Early in 1914 the committee polled 
all the national banks in the country on their preference for a Federal Re-
serve city with which they would be affiliated, giving them the opportuni-
ty to make a first, second, and third choice. The banks, of course, had no 
idea what the final Federal Reserve district lines might be, so several of them   
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selected as their choice of location of a Federal Reserve bank city that was not 
in their final district. (Indeed, four banks in California listed New York City as 
their second choice.) There is strong reason to believe that this poll of national 
banks was the most important single factor in determining the cities that re-
ceived Federal Reserve banks.
HELLO, BOSTON — GOODBYE, BALTIMORE
Many minor cities received only a scattering of votes (Sioux City, Iowa and 
Springfield, Massachusetts, for example). By weighing each national bank’s 
preferences as to first, second, and third choice, the committee finally came up 
with a list of the 12 cities with the most substantial support: Atlanta, Boston, 
Chicago, Cincinnati, Dallas, Kansas City, Minneapolis, New York, Philadel-
phia, Richmond, St. Louis, and San Francisco.
  On  April  2,  1914,  the  Reserve  Bank  Organization  Committee   
announced its decision. Eleven of the 12 cities attracting the greatest support in 
the national poll received Federal Reserve banks. The only city that did not was 
Cincinnati, which was included in the district belonging to the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Cleveland. Within each of the newly designated Federal Reserve dis-
tricts, the Federal Reserve city had received the most support from the national 
banks within its district, again with the sole exception of Cleveland; within that 
district both Cincinnati and Pittsburgh had generated more support.
  In  an  accompanying  statement  the  Reserve  Bank  Organization   
Committee outlined the basic criteria with which it justified its selections:
•  The ability of member banks within the district to provide the minimum 
capital—$4,000,000—required for each Federal Reserve bank by the law.
•  The  mercantile,  industrial,  and  financial  connections  existing  within   
each district.
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•  The probable ability of the Federal Reserve bank in each district to meet 
the legitimate business demands placed upon it.
•  The fair and equitable division of the available capital for the Federal Re-
serve banks among the districts.
•  Geographical  factors,  and  the  existing  network  of  transportation  and   
communication.
•  Population, area, and prevalent business activities of the districts.
  The fourth listed consideration—the fair and equitable division of the 
available capital among the Federal Reserve districts—was another way of stat-
ing the committee’s basic dilemma: the number of banks to be created and 
the size of the New York bank. The rural and agrarian spokesmen, as well 
as the smaller country banks and some big city institutions, had prevailed in 
their desire that 12 banks be created and that the size of the New York bank 
be somewhat limited. Even though the New York bank was limited to New 
York State alone (its district lines, and some others, were slightly modified in 
the following years), the New York bank with just over $20,000,000 in capital 
stock had nearly four times the capitalization of the smallest banks, Atlanta and 
Minneapolis with just under $5,000,000 in capital stock.
  Under the law each of the member banks would subscribe to the capi-
tal of its district Federal Reserve bank an amount equal to 6 percent of its 
own capital and surplus, and each Federal Reserve bank was required to have 
a capitalization of at least $4,000,000. If the capital stock of each of the   
Boston’s Park Street from the steps of the State House  
Courtesy, Boston Budget, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Archives43
Federal Reserve banks had been made approximately equal, however, the New 
York bank would have included only a small part of Manhattan Island, and 
the already enormous geographical size of the Atlanta and Minneapolis dis-
tricts would have been considerably larger. In such a case, moreover, parts of 
New York City would have been included in other districts (probably Boston, 
Philadelphia, and Cleveland, at least), and the size and shape of the other dis-
tricts would have probably been more grotesque than the wildest dream of the 
most enthusiastic gerrymanderer. Given the overwhelming size of New York’s 
financial resources, it was quite impossible to prevent the New York bank from   
being the largest and most dominant bank in the system, but it was consider-
ably smaller than the New York banking community had wanted.
  The Federal Reserve Bank Organization Committee’s statement suggest-
ed that the district lines had been drawn first and the cities selected after that, 
but in reality the process had been just the reverse: the cities were selected and 
then the district lines were drawn around them. There is also little indication 
that the committee had ever seriously considered choosing fewer than twelve 
cities. Given the inclination of McAdoo and Houston to disagree with the 
position of the New York bankers, such a result was not surprising. Moreover, 
with more than 40 cities making strong claims to be designated, the committee 
was able to satisfy more of them by choosing the maximum number of cities   
allowable. In following very closely the results of the poll among national 
banks, the committee was in a position to demonstrate that the new Federal 
Reserve System was anxious to work with bankers rather than to face them in 
angry confrontation.
  Naturally,  the  smaller  cities  which  had  been  named  were  overjoyed 
by their selection. “I have always said you and Houston were great men,” a   
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dream of the  
most enthusiastic 
gerrymanderer”  
by Adam  
Redjinski44
prominent Kansas City business leader told McAdoo. “Now there isn’t a man 
in Kansas City to dispute it.”4 Dallas and Richmond found their status in 
American banking greatly enhanced by their selection. Under the national 
banking system there were three central reserve cities and 47 reserve cities; 
theoretically, these 50 cities were the most important in American banking, but 
among them were, for example, Waco, Texas and Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Dallas 
and Richmond, however, had not been reserve cities, so their selection as sites 
for  regional  Federal  Reserve  banks 
increased  their  stature  as  regional   
financial centers.
CROSSFIRE
Yet  in  the  wake  of  the  commit-
tee’s announcement the voices that 
came  through  most  loudly  were 
not of gratification but of outrage.   
Lincoln,  Nebraska  protested  its   
exclusion,  but  no  one  really  paid 
much attention to that. Far more sig-
nificant complaints came from two   
undeniably major cities, which had 
not been designated—New Orleans 
and Baltimore. Both were consider-
ably larger than some of the smaller 
cities  selected  (Richmond,  Dallas, 
Atlanta,  Kansas  City,  and  Minne-
apolis) and both responded to their 
exclusion with mass protest demon-
strations. New Orleans, whose selec-
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tion as a Federal Reserve city had been expected by bankers from all over the 
country, held a mass meeting on Sunday evening, April 5, protesting the com-
mittee’s decision and demanding that it be reconsidered so that New Orleans 
could get a bank. Baltimore’s protest was perhaps even more spectacular. On 
April 15 the financial, business, and civic leadership of the city, along with 
hundreds of others, crowded the Lyric Theatre and heard the Mayor of Bal-
timore and the Governor of Maryland vigorously denounce the committee’s 
decision to pass over their city and name Richmond instead.
  Not only did the Reserve Bank Organization Committee receive much 
criticism for the cities it did not name, but it also heard loud complaints about 
some of the cities it did select. H. Parker Willis, who had assisted the commit-
tee in its work, believed that Richmond was the selection most difficult to jus-
tify. It was one of the smaller cities so designated, and many doubted the need 
for two Federal Reserve districts (Atlanta and Richmond) in the Southeast. 
Moreover, Richmond’s selection lay open to the charge that it was a case of   
political favoritism, for Carter Glass was a Virginian and John Skelton Wil-
liams, Comptroller of the Currency and one of the three committee members, 
was from Richmond itself. Cleveland’s selection was questioned because Cin-
cinnati and Pittsburgh had received more support from the national banks 
within the district, and because it was the home of Secretary of War New-
ton D. Baker, an unusually prominent member of the Wilson Cabinet. There 
was some criticism of the selection of both St. Louis and Kansas City because 
both are in Missouri, a state with enormous political influence in the Wilson   
Baltimore protests the choice of Federal Reserve cities
Courtesy, Baltimore Public Library46
Administration. The Speaker of the House, Champ Clark, was from Missouri 
(he had nearly beaten Wilson for the Democratic nomination in 1912); Sena-
tor James Reed, from Kansas City, was one of the most prominent men in the 
upper house; and Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston, one of the three 
members of the Reserve Bank Organization Committee, came to his cabinet 
position from St. Louis.
        These  questions  of  political  favoritism  in  the  selection  of  Federal   
Reserve cities (especially Richmond and the two in Missouri) led to several days 
of debate in the House of Representatives. After hearing much intense criti-
cism, Carter Glass sprang to the defense of the committee and its selections, 
and he suggested that the importance of Federal Reserve banks to the cities in 
which they would be located had been overemphasized. He also denied playing 
any role in the selection of Richmond. President Wilson also came to the com-
mittee’s defense while stoutly maintaining that he had offered the committee   
no suggestions.
  Stung by this criticism from around the country and within Congress, 
the Reserve Bank Organization Committee made public the poll of national 
banks, hoping to demonstrate that any favoritism shown had not been to poli-
ticians but to banking opinion. A few days later, on April 10, the committee 
issued a lengthy statement defending its choices. Attempting to mollify the 
disappointed cities, the committee argued that designation or the failure to 
designate any particular city would not be important to that city’s future, and 
that the normal patterns of business and banking would not be affected by 
the creation of the twelve Federal Reserve districts. “Every city which has the   
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foundations for prosperity and progress will continue to grow and expand, 
whether it has such a reserve bank or not, and well-informed bankers, espe-
cially, are aware of this,” the committee said.
  Moving on to defend its most controversial selections, the committee 
suggested that it chose the 12 cities that it did because they were the most 
important in terms of banking resources, central location, and communica-
tion and transportation facilities. Though Dallas, Atlanta, and New Orleans 
had comparably sized bank business, the committee thought it especially note-
worthy that the banking business of both Atlanta and Dallas had more than 
doubled in the past decade while the banking business of New Orleans had 
remained stable. In addition, Dallas and Atlanta were the overwhelming choice 
of the banks in their regions, while it was generally only the Louisiana banks 
that favored New Orleans. As for Richmond, the committee pointed out that 
banks in the district preferred it over Baltimore, and that it was more centrally 
located while Baltimore was at the northern edge of the district and very close 
to Philadelphia. While Baltimore’s banking resources were clearly greater than 
those of Richmond, the latter’s had grown five times more rapidly during the 
past decade. As for Kansas City, the committee again pointed out that it, far 
more than any other city in the district, had been the choice of the national 
banks. None of the other major cities in the district—Denver, Omaha, or Lin-
coln—even came close to the banking resources of Kansas City.
  The committee’s statement contained some inconsistencies. On the one 
hand it argued that failure to receive a Federal Reserve bank did not mean that 
a particular city lacked importance or that its future growth would suffer; on 
the other hand, the committee justified its most controversial choices by argu-
ing that the cities selected were, in fact, more important in terms of location, 
banking resources, and future potential than their disappointed rivals.
  Controversies  about  the  cities  selected  and  some  of  the  district  lines 
would persist for several years. From time to time the Federal Reserve Board 
has slightly modified some of the district lines, but none of these changes were 
major. Perhaps the most noteworthy occurred in 1916, when the Board moved 
Fairfield  County,  Connecticut  from  the  Boston  district  to  the  New  York   
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district, and the northern New Jersey counties from the Philadelphia district to 
the New York district. This change was made at the request of the local bank-
ers, who had been very unhappy about their exclusion from the district of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. More important, however, the twelve cities 
originally named by the committee have retained their Federal Reserve banks, 
and after the System had been in operation for only a few years no serious 
challenge arose against any of them. In short, despite the outcry from many 
quarters, the decision announced by the Reserve Bank Organization Commit-
tee on April 2, 1914, has not been changed.
GETTING IT TOGETHER
After choosing the twelve Federal Reserve cities and drawing the district lines, 
the Reserve Bank Organization Committee had to bring the more than 7,000 
national banks into formal membership in the new system, and it had to pro-
vide for the organization of the 12 Federal Reserve banks. Also, the President 
had to nominate five members to the Federal Reserve Board who would be 
acceptable to the Senate. Until these major actions were taken, America’s new 
experiment in central banking could not begin.
  During the debate over the Federal Reserve Act in Congress, and soon 
after its passage, there had been many fears that the vocal opposition of most 
of the banking community would mean that large numbers of national banks 
would give up their charters rather than join the Federal Reserve System. Yet 
these fears never materialized. In fact, only a very few national banks took this 
step. Following the passage of the Federal Reserve Act many bankers either rec-
onciled themselves to the new system, with the determination to make it work 
well, or came to accept that the Federal Reserve Act contained many benefits 
and improvements that they had not fully appreciated before.
  A few days after final congressional passage of the bill, a director for a 
major Boston bank expressed his own change of opinion in a letter to David 
Houston: “I hardly need to tell you that the attitude of our Directors—and I 
presume this has been the experience in every bank—has changed completely 
in regard to the currency bill. They started out with a strong prejudice against 
it, and a feeling that it would almost be necessary to keep out of the system, 
even if that meant reorganization [that is, replacing the national charter with 
a state charter]; but the very great improvement which the bill cannot help 
effecting in our currency situation has gradually impressed itself upon us, and, 
in addition, the progressive changes which have been made in the bill have 
created a very favorable impression. I don’t meet anybody now who, whatever 
his views as to possible dangers, does not feel that the advantages outweigh   
the dangers.”5
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The Federal Reserve Act had specified that the national banks had 60 days 
after the passage of the law to indicate their acceptance of it, and within a 
month more than two-thirds of them had done so. By the end of February, 
1914, just after the expiration of the 60-day period, it was clear that more 
than 99 percent of the national banks had accepted the new law and had 
joined the System in order to retain their national charters. The Federal Re-
serve Act also allowed state chartered banks to apply for membership, but in 
1914 the Organization Committee gave very little attention to this issue. By 
April, only 73 state chartered banks in the nation applied for membership. 
It was not until after the System actually began functioning that the Federal   
Reserve Board gave any serious consideration to this question. In New Eng-
land, there were no state chartered members until August, 1915.
  Under the Federal Reserve Act all member banks had to subscribe to an 
amount of stock in their own regional Federal Reserve bank equal to 6 percent 
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of their capital and surplus. By May, five national banks had subscribed the 
minimum required capitalization of $4 million in each of the 12 districts, 
so the committee formally selected five national banks in each district to   
organize the regional reserve bank and expressed the hope that the 12 banks 
would be able to open for business by August 1. In New England the five 
selected were: First National Bank, Bridgeport, Connecticut; Casco Nation-
al Bank, Portland, Maine; National Shawmut Bank, Boston; First National 
Bank, Concord, New Hampshire; and the National Bank of Commerce, Provi-
dence, Rhode Island. It was up to the five banks in each of the 12 districts to   
execute the formal certificate of incorporation, and this was done on or just 
after May 18 in all 12 districts.
ELECTING LOCAL DIRECTORS
The next step was for the member banks to elect six of the nine members of the 
Board of Directors for each Federal Reserve bank. Following the specific provi-
sions of the law, the Reserve Bank Organization Com-
mittee divided the member banks within each district   
according to capitalization: the largest one-third in one 
grouping, the middle one-third in a second grouping, 
and the smallest one-third in a third grouping. Of the 
six directors elected by the member banks, three were 
to  represent  the  banks  themselves  (Class  A  Direc-
tors) while the other three were to represent the com-
merce,  agriculture,  or  industry  of  the  district  while 
having no connection with a commercial bank (Class 
B  Directors).  Each  of  the  three  groupings  of  mem-
ber banks would elect one Class A Director and one   
Class B Director. In other words, each member bank 
would have a vote in the selection of only two of the 
nine members of the Board of Directors. The final three 
directors (Class C Directors) for each Federal Reserve 
bank were to be appointed by the Federal Reserve Board, 
one of the Class C directors being designated chairman and 
another Class C director being designated vice chairman. Under the Federal Re-
serve Act the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency were   
“ex-officio” members of the Federal Reserve Board, while the other five mem-
bers were to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for 
10-year terms. (The Banking Act of 1935 changed the composition of the 
Board, which was officially renamed the Board of Governors of the Federal   
Reserve System. Under this new law the Board was to consist of seven mem-
bers, each of whom would be appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Governor Alfred L. Aiken,  
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Senate for fourteen-year terms; the Secretary 
of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the 
Currency no longer served on the Board.)
WILSON’S CHOICES:   
THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD
President  Wilson  waited  until  the  Organi-
zation  Committee  had  selected  the  cities 
and  had  drawn  the  district  lines  before  he   
announced his choices for the Federal Reserve 
Board. For one thing, only one of the appoint-
ed members of the Board could come from 
any  one  Federal  Reserve  district,  so  clearly 
the lines had to be drawn before the appoint-
ments  could  be  made.  Moreover,  Wilson’s   
five appointments were 
among  the  most  im-
portant  he  had  been 
called upon to make in 
his  presidency,  and  it 
took some time for him 
to make his choices.
 On May 4 the Presi-
dent sent his five nom-
inations to the Senate. 
They  were:  Richard 
Olney,  conservative 
Boston  lawyer  and 
Secretary of State un-
der Grover Cleveland 
20 years earlier; Harry 
A.  Wheeler,  Chicago 
businessman  and  former  president  of  the 
United States Chamber of Commerce; Paul 
M. Warburg, partner in the Wall Street in-
vestment firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Company, 
and an opponent of the Federal Reserve bill 
while  it  was  before  Congress;  Adolph  C. 
Miller, a former professor of economics at 
the University of California; and William P. 
G. Harding, president of the First National 
Richard Olney
Courtesy, Library of Congress52
Bank of Birmingham, Alabama, and a 
champion of his own city as the site 
for a Federal Reserve bank.
         Almost as soon as Wilson named 
his  choices  he  faced  embarrassment. 
Olney was probably the most promi-
nent  of  the  nominees,  but  his  stew-
ardship of the State Department had 
been  filled  with  controversy,  and,   
citing his advanced age as the reason, 
he declined the appointment. Wheeler 
also turned down the offer.
  The President’s embarrassment 
soon  turned  into  a  nasty  political 
confrontation with the Senate. While 
Wilson’s selections proved very popu-
lar among America’s banking leaders, 
the President’s natural political allies—the progressives—were deeply and bit-
terly disappointed. Within Wilson’s official family Secretary McAdoo strongly 
advocated the appointment of a Board that would work with him to break 
what he considered to be Wall Street’s control over the nation’s credit. The 
President rejected McAdoo’s argument in favor of the position of Colonel   
Edward M. House, Wilson’s most important adviser. House advocated the   
selection of men who would win the confidence and cooperation of the bank-
ing community, and the President gave him a free hand to consult widely 
among conservatives and among the banking leadership for suggestions.
  The progressives were appalled by the nominations, and the pleasure ex-
pressed by bankers and conservatives only deepened their suspicions. After Ol-
ney and Wheeler declined appointment, Wilson, on June 15, named in their 
place Charles S. Hamlin, a Democrat 
from Boston, and Thomas D. Jones, 
a businessman from Chicago. These   
replacements,  particularly  Jones, 
only  angered  the  progressives  fur-
ther. Led by Senator James Reed of 
Missouri,  the  progressives  directed 
more of their fire at Warburg and 
Jones. Warburg was suspect because 
he  represented  a  prominent  Wall 
Street investment house and because 
he had been a strong champion of 
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that bete noir of the progressives, the Aldrich plan. 
Jones was suspect because he was a director of the 
International Harvester Company, a trust that was 
universally hated by the middle western farmers 
and progressives, and which was under both state 
and federal indictment in 1914 as an illegal busi-
ness  combination  in  restraint  of  trade.  Wilson 
was  particularly  embarrassed  and  embittered  by 
the opposition to Jones, for the latter was an old 
friend who had sided with him during his contro-
versies  as  president  of  Princeton  University  and 
who had contributed large sums of money to his 
presidential  campaign  of  1912.  Moreover,  Jones 
had  reluctantly  accepted  the  appointment  only   
after Wilson had appealed to him on the basis of   
their friendship.
      President Wilson decided to fight vigorously 
for the Senate confirmation of his five choices, and 
he came out with particular force for his old friend 
Jones. He argued that Jones, as a director of Inter-
national Harvester, had been working to end the 
activities which had brought that company under indictment. In July, Jones 
testified before the Senate Banking Committee, which was holding hearings 
on the President’s five nominations, and he weakened his own case by show-
ing more sympathy with the policies of International Harvester than Wilson 
had suggested was the case. A few days later the committee voted, seven to 
four, to disapprove Jones’s nomination. Infuriated, Wilson determined to carry 
his fight for his friend’s confirmation to the Senate floor. Despite very heavy   
Administration pressure, a number of Democratic senators normally aligned 
with Wilson refused to accept Jones. The President, seeing that his friend could 
not prevail in a Senate vote, asked him to withdraw his nomination. Jones, 
who had not been eager to serve on the Federal Reserve Board in the first place, 
gladly complied. This was Wilson’s first defeat at the hands of either house   
of Congress.
  As a replacement for Jones, the President nominated Frederic A. Delano, 
president  of  the  Monon  Railroad,  and  he  was  easily  confirmed  by   
the Senate.
  Meanwhile the Senate Banking Committee had also requested Warburg 
to appear before it. Warburg’s pride was so wounded by this request—he 
seemed to feel that he was being asked to appear at an inquisition—that he 
requested the President to withdraw his nomination. Wilson refused to do so 
Courtesy, The New York Times, July 22, 191454
and pleaded with Warburg to appear before the committee as Jones had done. 
Senator Hitchcock assured Warburg that he would be treated kindly. In early 
August, Warburg finally consented to testify, and he was promptly approved 
by the committee and confirmed by the Senate. Apparently the defeat of Jones, 
and Warburg’s ultimate appearance before the committee, was victory enough 
for the progressives, for they made no serious attempt to block confirmation 
of Wilson’s three other selections. Perhaps most significantly, Wilson’s appoint-
ments to the Federal Reserve Board were very welcome to the banking com-
munity, and they indicated that the President wished to inaugurate the Federal 
Reserve System in cooperation with the financial community of the nation.
  On August 10, 1914, the Federal Reserve Board was officially sworn into 
office, with Charles S. Hamlin designated Governor (i.e., Chairman), and 
Frederic A. Delano, Vice Governor, and it took over the work that had been 
started by the Reserve Bank Organization Committee. Two factors, however, 
were to delay the opening of the new Federal Reserve Banks. One was the slow-
ness of the member banks in electing the six Class A and Class B directors. The 
other was the beginning of World War I in Europe; the outbreak of war had 
such a profound impact upon American business and banking that it made it 
even more difficult to open the reserve banks, yet far more essential that they 
be opened as soon as possible.
Members, Federal Reserve Board. Clockwise: W.G. McAdoo, John Skelton Williams,  
A.G. Miller, F.O. Delano, H. Parker Willis, W.P.G. Harding, P.M. Warburg, and C.S. Hamlin 
Courtesy, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Washington, D.C.55
  The newly appointed Board had to appoint the three Class C directors 
for each of the 12 banks. It also worked on drafting by-laws for the 12 banks, 
so that the banks could be as uniform as possible. Many other details and tech-
nical considerations occupied the Board’s attention: the staffing of each of the 
banks, with the selection of officers; the provision of office space; precise guide-
lines for the kind of commercial paper that member banks could rediscount, and 
a workable mechanism for the rediscount of such paper; the design and printing 
of the new currency, Federal Reserve notes; and finally, provision for the transfer 
of reserves from the central reserve and reserve city banks to the new Federal 
Reserve banks.
  Some of the Federal Reserve Banks were moving ahead more rapidly than 
others, and the Board seemed willing to open each bank as it became ready. 
However, Treasury Secretary McAdoo decided that the banks should all open for 
business at the same time. McAdoo’s determination put pressure on the Federal 
Reserve Board to name all of the Class C directors speedily and on the slower 
banks to prepare for an early opening.
  On October 20, after all of the Class C directors had been named, all nine 
directors from all twelve banks met in Washington to prepare for the opening of 
the banks. By this time the Federal Reserve Board had come to accept McAdoo’s 
determination that all 12 banks open at the same date. The various directors, 
however, could not agree what the specific date ought to be.
Directors from the 12 Federal Reserve banks meeting in Washington, D.C.
Courtesy, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Archives56
  A  few  days  after  the  Washington  meeting  McAdoo  himself  publicly   
announced that the Federal Reserve banks would all open on Monday, November 
16. He also said that as soon as the 12 banks were opened, the federal govern-
ment  would transfer as much of its government funds as possible to the various   
reserve banks.
  On November 16, the 12 Federal Reserve banks started operations with little 
fanfare and, in some cases, with less business. In no case had permanent quar-
ters  been  arranged, 
and in many quarters 
there was a very large   
question of how long 
the  Federal  Reserve 
System  would  last. 
In most of the banks 
a  clerk  or  two  over-
saw  the  small  trickle 
of business, and their 
work  was  often  seen 
somewhat  as  a  nov-
elty.  The  Federal   
Reserve Bank of Bos-
ton began operations 
in  rented  quarters 
at  101  Milk  Street,   
approximately the lo-
cation of the perma-
nent  building,  with 
expansions,  that  the 
bank  was  to  occupy 
from the early 1920s 
through  the  middle 
1970s.
  Inauspicious 
as  it  was,  Novem-
ber  16,  1914—the 
opening  of  the  Fed-
eral Reserve Banks—
marks  the  end  of 
this story. In the 60 years that have passed, those banks have remained in   
operation, and their activities and responsibilities have expanded enormously. 
Facsimile of portions of the first and final pages of the Federal Reserve Act of 191357
Comptroller of the Currency, John Skelton Williams, authorizes the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
to commence business
Courtesy, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Archives
With the passage and implementation of the Federal Reserve Act, the United 
States had initiated the central banking system which persists today—to serve 
and add stability to the commercial banking system and to monitor and influ-
ence the American economy.58
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